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1Does Cash Flow cause Investment and R&D:
An Exploration Using Panel Data for French, Japanese,
and United States Scientic Firms
Bronwyn H. Hall, Jacques Mairesse, Lee Branstetter and Bruno Crepon
ABSTRACT
The role of nancial institutions and corporate governance in the conduct and performance
of industrial rms, especially in the area of technological innovation and international compe-
tition has been hotly debated in the recent past. The results presented here are a contribution
to the empirical evidence on the behavior of individual rms that exist in somewhat dierent
institutional environments. Using a Panel Data version of the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR)
methodology, we test for causal relationship among sales and cash ﬂow on the one hand and
investment and R&D on the other, using three large panels of rms in the scientic (high
technology) sectors in the United States, France, and Japan. Our ndings are that both invest-
ment and R&D are more highly sensitive to cash ﬂow and sales in the United States than in
France and Japan. Correspondingly, both investment and R&D predict both cash ﬂow and sales
positively in the United States, while the impact is somewhat more mixed in the other countries.
Keywords: corporate nance, panel data, liquidity constraints, international comparisons.
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1 Introduction
It is a widely held view that the capital market and corporate governance systems of such
countries as France, Germany, and Japan dier in important ways from those of the so-called
\Anglo-Saxon" countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, and possibly Canada. Those
who hold this view argue that features such as interlocking directorates, large scale share-
holding by banks, restrictions on and the absence of hostile takeover activity, relatively less
active share markets, and a general tendency to rely on voice rather than exit lead to more
extensive monitoring by large institutional shareholders and possibly to a greater willingness
on the part of rms to undertake long term risky investments than exists in the more actively
traded capital markets of the United States and the United Kingdom.2
If this view is accurate, it is natural to ask whether one can see its eects in the investment
patterns of rms in these countries, and in their relationship to such indicators of nancial
performance as sales and cash ﬂow. We think that looking at the dynamic relationships of
output measures such as deﬂated sales and cash ﬂow with investment inputs (both tangible
and intangible) in similar samples of rms in a comparison group of countries is one way to
investigate whether the institutional dierence in these countries, which undoubtedly exist,
1Nueld College, Oxford University, University of California at Berkeley and NBER; INSEE/CREST,
EHESS, and NBER; University of California at Davis and NBER; INSEE, Paris. .
2Among others, see Franks and Mayer (1990) [France, Germany, and the U.K.], Kester (1992) [Japan and
Germany], Mayer and Alexander (1990)[Germany and UK], and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990)[Japan],
Hall (1994) [U.S. plus some international comparisons], and Soskice (1995) [Germany, Japan, U.S., U.K., and
France] for evidence on this topic.
3have consequences for the real behavior of rms. If we cannot see evidence of dierences at this
level, then it seems unlikely that the contrasting institutional features can be having much of
an impact on the rms' actual performance.
In Mairesse and Hall (1996), two of us explored the simultaneity between output (sales)
and inputs (capital stock, labor, and R&D capital) while estimating production functions for
the United States and France. During the course of this exploration, we found evidence that
investment in both research and development and in physical capital were more sensitive to
sales growth in the United States than in France, suggesting that either demand shocks or
liquidity constraints play a more important role in determining investment in the former country
than the latter. In work closely related to ours, Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay (1995)
found that investment spending in UK rms was more sensitive to cash ﬂow or prots than
investment spending in French, German, or Belgian rms; their nding was robust to changes
in specication of the investment equation. They did not consider research and development
investment in their work.
The current paper explores the nding in the earlier work of Mairesse and Hall and extends
it by including cash ﬂow as a variable in addition to sales, employment, and investment of
both kinds (tangible and R&D), and by augmenting the data samples with data on another
country whose institutions dier from both those in the United States and France, that is,
Japan. For data reasons, and because we are particularly interested in the role played by
country environments in the encouragement of industrial innovation and technical change, we
restrict our sample in this paper to rms in the scientic or high technology sectors in these
countries, that is, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Electrical Machinery, Computing Equipment,
Electronics, and Scientic Instruments.3
Our second motivation in undertaking this study is an interest in exploring further the use
3We have excluded aircraft and aerospace because of the large share of federal government spending on
investment in these industries, and the role of the federal government as the primary customer for the output,
which means that these industries behave quite dierently in these three countries, for reasons largely unrelated
to our central interest.
4of ecient Generalized Method of Moments estimation on panel data where we allow for the
presence of both correlated eects and lagged dependent variables. In this, our immediate
inspiration was Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), although we have also made use of
ideas in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1994), and Blundell and Bond (1995).
An appendix to this paper chronicles some of our simulation experience with the problem
of distinguishing a model with correlated eects from one in which there are no eects, but
where each rm's data follows an autoregressive process with a unit root in short panels. Our
conclusions are twofold: First, we nd that it is frequently dicult to distinguish the two when
the lag length is unknown. Second, instrumental variable estimation (GMM) of models with
correlated eects is subject to substantial nite sample bias even in fairly good-sized sample
sizes (approximately 300-400 rms), when the number of time periods available is fairly large
(12 years, in our case) and the ecient estimator is used.4 Because of this, we use a slightly less
ecient estimator in the body of the paper (one with fewer instruments and therefore fewer
orthogonality conditions) that is somewhat better behaved.
This paper begins with a discussion of the issues raised by comparative corporate governance
studies, most of which are fairly qualitative, for the examination of rm-level behavior across
G-7 countries. Then we describe our datasets, and how we attempt to make them as comparable
as possible across the three countries we consider. We present some basic descriptive data in
order to illustrate the similarities and dierences. In a related paper (Hall and Mairesse 1998),
we explore the question of whether the univariate time series properties of our basic variable
set (deﬂated sales, R&D investment, ordinary investment, number of employees, and cash ﬂow
before investment and taxes) suggest the presence of correlated rm eects or whether they
display unit root behavior. Our conclusion here is that it is extremely dicult to distinguish
the two in these data because of the short length of the time period and the fact that the
instruments available for dierenced estimation are weak if the data is close to a random walk.
4In the case here, where we have lagged predetermined variables as regressors (not strictly exogenous) and
xed rm eects, the number of orthogonality conditions in the ecient GMM estimator increases at the rate
T 2 in general.
5We have included permanent rm eects in all the models in the subsequent section, although
only it is probably that only investment is the only stationary process in these data.5
Section 4 contains the meat of the paper: the results of bivariate causality testing between
our two output measures (deﬂated sales and cash ﬂow) and our two investment measures (R&D
and ordinary investment). In future work, we plan to expand the bivariate model to control for
other variables, but we believe that the current results are worth reporting even in the absence
of such controls.
2 Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate
Capital
In the recent past, many economists and other researchers have attempted to characterize the
contrasting styles of corporate governance in the major industrial economies. This research
has been spurred by a general increase in global competition during the nineteen-eighties:
this increased competition simultaneously revealed the comparative strength of economies like
Germany and Japan, especially in manufacturing, and caused substantial turbulence in the
United States and United Kingdom, turbulence driven partly by a perceived need to restructure
and shrink industries in the face of increasing foreign competition. Although the particular set
of considerations that focused attention on these issues may have lost importance in the most
recent past, the question of whether institutions \matter" for the performance of the industrial
sector of an economy is still an interesting and important one.
The fact that corporate governance and nancing institutions dier across the three coun-
tries considered here (the United States, France, and Japan) is not in question. The issue is
whether selection operates in such a way as to undo the possible negative eects that each set
of institutions might have as the institutions evolve, causing the actual observed behavior of
rms in these countries to be closer than implied by the caricatures of the corporate governance
5It is clear that all of the series are either nonstationary OR have a xed rm eect. It is distinguishing
these two possibilities in the presence of serially correlated disturbances that is the diculty.
6literature. As Gilson (1995) points out, institutions can dier at rst, but if they do not func-
tion eectively, they will either be selected out, or they may evolve some of the characteristics
toward those of successful institutions. As an example of the forces that push institutions to
evolve, consider the rise of EASDAQ in Europe and the attempts to create a successful capital
market for new rms and startups in France. In this paper, we focus on the consequences
of institutional dierences across the three countries for the investment behavior of individual
technology rms.
Table 1 presents a stylized view of the corporate governance structures in the U.S., France,
and Japan that is due to David Soskice (1995); one can nd similar discussions in other places,
see Charkham (1994), for example. This table focuses on a set of relationships between an
industrial company and its owners: who the owners are, how they monitor the behavior of
the rm, what happens when restructuring is necessary, and the incentives faced by the Chief
Executive Ocer. The major contrast is between Japan and the U.S.: in the former country,
even when ownership is dispersed, the management of the shares tends to be delegated to
large shareholders (like banks), and monitoring and restructuring tends to be done by the
main bank or major shareholder in the rm. Public nancial markets place relatively little
pressure on the rm. In the latter country, the opposite picture prevails: ownership is dispersed,
and the monitoring of the rm and restructuring take place in public. Because considerable
data on the rm's activities is publicly available, monitoring by outsiders and shareholders is
somewhat easier (although incentives to monitor are low for small shareholders, of course).
And restructuring is often achieved via hostile takeover or acquisition by outsiders rather than
quietly within the rm or its keiretsu.
The situation in France is somewhere in between the other two, possibly leaning toward the
Japanese system. There are more large block shareholders, and many small shareholders hold
"bearer" shares, which imply that there is no way a rm can supply information directly to these
shareholders, even if it wanted to. Therefore monitoring tends to be done by a few shareholders,
7banks, or even the government in the case of rms that are wholly or partially government
owned. Restructuring tends to be managed within a fairly elite network of private/public
managers and holding companies, and is not often hostile as it is in the United States.
TABLE 1
A Stylized View of Corporate Governance Structures in the 1980s
Company-Owner
Relationship U.S. France Japan
Ownership dispersed delegated delegated
monitoring monitoring
Monitoring public data unsystematic; direct;
evolving product market
Restructuring takeovers decisions within main bank
an elite network
CEO's incentives high powered; public-private low power;
market-oriented network for company men
promotion
Length of nancial
commitment SHORT LONG? LONG
Source: David Soskice, presentation to WZB, June 22, 1995.
Based on these comparisons of owner-manager relationships, many have suggested that
company owners in the United States will tend to have a much shorter-term commitment to
the rms in which they hold shares, whether or not they actually trade them more often. In fact,
nancial markets in the United States are quite accommodating to this kind of shareholder,
as they are very thick and active. Thus \exit" is viewed as a viable option by an unhappy
shareholder in the U.S., while less so in the other two countries, where "voice" is more likely
to be used. That is, shareholders in dierent countries are somewhat self-selected in response
to the institutional dierences, with greater concentration and/or a willingness to hold shares
for a longer period in France and Japan than in the United States.
8The conclusion of this kind of argument is the suggestion that rms in the United States
may try harder to satisfy shareholders in the short run, rather than taking a long term view.6
Thus, an implication of this world view is that rms in Japan and France may nd it easier
to undertake longer-term investments. A second implication is that because they do not have
to go to the external capital markets to nance new investment, but can potentially rely on
agents that are not in the public market (either their main bank or another rm in the group in
Japan, and an informal network or the government in France), rms in these two countries may
be less subject to \liquidity constraints" when undertaking investment. It is this possibility
that we explore in this paper, where we compare the bivariate relationship of cash indicators
such as sales and cash ﬂow with investment and R&D across the three countries. We ask two
questions: First, what does conventional causality testing have to say about the relationship?
Does our cash proxy cause investment or the other way around? Second, what is the size of
the impact of lagged cash on investment or R&D? Does it vary across countries?
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our goal is to produce similar samples of high-technology manufacturing rms for each of
our countries: France, the United States, and Japan. However, our sources of data are quite
dierent and this means that the samples will never be exactly comparable, although they are
quite representative. Table 2 gives the sources of our data, our deﬂators, and some indication
of the number of observations available to us, both before and after cleaning. The primary
dierence in the data sources is between France and the other two countries: in France, we
have access to a Census of Manufactures-type sample with R&D data collected in survey form
by the government for the Ministere de la Recherche. This means the data tend to be at a
6Obviously perfect capital markets would overturn this result easily; in markets that correctly value the
expected present discounted value of the future returns to investment, it makes no dierence what the horizon
of an individual investor is. But there is some empirical evidence that this theoretical prediction is not always
true, and the apparent persistence of the belief on the part of rms that they must manage their stock price
quarterly suggests that we cannot ignore the possibility that short-termism in ownership may lead to some
short-termism in investment.
9level somewhat lower than that of consolidated accounts (the \group" level), and that it is not
conned to publicly traded rms.7 For the other two countries, we have data based on the
lings of publicly-traded rms with agencies charged with monitoring the nancial markets.
Although the Japanese data are somewhat less consolidated than those for the United States,
in the sense that they are not at the \group" level, they are consolidated to a level roughly
comparable to that in the United States. Also in the case of Japan, the R&D data has been
augmented with data from another survey, because the quality of publicly reported R&D data
is very uneven.8
The deﬂators also dier somewhat across countries. In all cases, we deﬂate R&D, investment,
and cash ﬂow by a deﬂator that is common across all industries.9 On the other hand, we have
attempted to varying degrees to construct real output measures rather than sales by deﬂating
our sales gures by at least a 2-digit-level deﬂator. In the United States, we are using deﬂators
aggregated up to the 2-digit level from the NBER Productivity Database, which is at the
4-digit level (Bartelsman and Gray 1994). In France, we are using the N40 industry level
deﬂator (approximately 2-digit), which do not contain very much of the type of hedonic quality
adjustment that is used in the United States. In Japan, we have constructed \rm-level"
deﬂators based on the 4-digit industry composition of the rm's output.
Our choice of years (1978-1989) reﬂects data availability, as well as a desire to have a
fairly long time series available for each variable for use in instrumental variables estimation.
Because these datasets are large, and in some cases fairly dirty, and because we want to focus
7In this, our problem is similar to that of Bond et al (1995), who had consolidated data for the UK and
not for France, Germany, and Belgium. This feature of our data makes things particularly dicult, since it is
driven fundamentally by the same institutional dierences on which we have focused our interest. That is, the
existence of an active public equity market means that data are publicly available at the level of the consolidated
rm or at the level at which the shares trade. Absent this market, one is forced to use government or Central
Bank data (as in France, Germany, and Japan), and such data tends to be unconsolidated. This may have
implications for the "softness" of the budget constraint faced by the rm, but it is exactly that dierence in
which we are interested. The ideal exercise would be to compare estimates at dierent levels of consolidation.
Bond et al (1995) have begun such an exploration.
8See Griliches and Mairesse (1990) for further discussion of this point.
9Thus we are implicitly assuming that the market for capital goods, and the market for R&D are common
across all our rms, so they face the same prices. In fact, even when measured carefully, there is little variation
in the relative price of investment goods across industries, so our procedure is unlikely to produce much bias.
10on the common time series properties across rms, rather than isolated reorganizations and
other specic disturbances, we apply cleaning rules to all the variables: First, we require their
growth rates to be between -90% and 900%. Second, in order to remove erroneous data values
that might produce misleading autoregressive estimates, we remove rms that have sequential
growth rates that are large and alternate in sign. For sales and employment, large is dened
as below -50% or above 100%; for R&D, it is -67%, 200%; for investment and cash ﬂow, it is
-80%, 400%. Finally, we work with the logarithms of all the variables, in order to minimize
heteroskedasticity and problems with inﬂuential outliers.
After cleaning, and requiring a full 12 years of data for each rm, we are left with 204 rms
for the United States, 156 for France, and 221 for Japan. Table 3 gives some indication of the
typical size of these rms, and their importance in their national economies. Each sample is a
small but not insignicant portion of its economy, and a larger fraction of that economy's private
R&D activity. The Japanese sample has the largest coverage of both GDP and BERD (Business
Enterprise R&D) and the French sample the smallest. Although the national R&D intensities
are ranked Japan (2.2%), the U.S. (2.0%), and France (1.6%), the typical rm in these samples
is more R&D-intensive in the U.S. (with an R&D to sales ratio of 4.0%), followed by France
(3.6%) , and then Japan (2.8%). This perhaps reﬂects the somewhat greater selectivity of the
U.S. and French samples, and the large integrated rm structure typical of Japan. Because of
this vertical integration, we suspect that our Japanese rms are slightly less concentrated in
the high-technology sector than the sample of rms from the other two countries.
11TABLE 2
Dataset Characteristics
France United States Japan
Source Enquete annuelle sur Standard and Needs data;
les moyens consacres Poor's Compustat data from JDB
a la recherche et Data - annual (R&D data from
au developpement industrial and Toyo Keizai
dans les entreprises; OTC, based on survey)
Enquete annuelle des 10-K lings
entreprises to SEC
Scientic Sector 1978-89, good R&D 1978-89, good R&D 1978-89 good R&D
# r m s 953 863 424
# observations 5,842 6,417 5,088
Cleaned (#obs.) 5,139 5,721 4,260
No jumps (#obs.) 5,108 5,312 4,215
Balanced 1978-89
(#obs.) 1,872 2,448 2,652
(# rms) 156 204 221
Positive Cash Flow
(# rms) 104 174 200
This sector consists of rms in Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Electrical Machinery, Computing
Equipment, Electronics, and Scientic Instruments.
12TABLE 3
Sample Comparison
The Median Firm (National Currency)
Variable United States France Japan
($M 1987) (M FF 1987) (100M yen 1987)
Sales 249.0 465.6 570.6
R&D 9.8 16.2 15.1
Investment 14.0 15.3 42.4
Cash Flow 43.9 59.7 62.1
Employment 2,762 604 1,732
(numbers)
The Median Firm (at PPP Exchange Rates in $M 1987)
Variable United States France Japan
Sales 249.0 67.3 283.5
R&D 9.8 2.4 7.6
Investment 14.0 2.1 21.1
Cash Flow 43.9 8.4 30.0
1989 GDP ($N87) 4,730. 758. 1,885.
Sample Sales/GDP 10.1% 5.4% 17.1%
1989 BERD ($B87) 93.9 12.0 40.9
Sample share of BERD 29.9% 21.0% 41.2%
GDP in 1989$ at PPP exchange rates is from OECD (1991a), converted to 1987$.
BERD is Business Enterprise R&D, from OECD (1991b) in 1989$ at PPP exchange rates (ap-
proximately 7 francs per $ and 200 yen per $.
13Figures 1 and 2 display the trends in the median growth rates and interquartile ranges for
the three samples. The rst thing to note in these gures is that there is more dierence in the
patterns among the variables than among the countries, with cash ﬂow and ordinary investment
ﬂuctuating much more over the cycle than sales, R&D, and employment. The dispersion of
growth rates in all 3 countries (measured by the interquartile range within each year) is also
quite similar across the variables, except for the rather anomalous cash ﬂow range in France.
It is perhaps worth noting also that the ﬂuctuations of the median and interquartile dispersion
of employment growth rates are somewhat higher in the United States, although relatively low
in all 3 countries. In other words, over the business cycle large manufacturing rms tend to
increase and decrease employment more in the United States than in Japan and France, and the
variance across rms of this behavior is also higher, facts that are consistent with the oft-cited
ﬂexibility of the U.S. labor market.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figure 3 shows the trends in three ratios over the three countries: the median R&D intensity
(measured as R&D to sales), the median investment to sales ratio, and the median cash ﬂow to
sales ratio. The R&D to sales ratio is ﬂat in France, while it increases during the period in both
the U.S. and Japan. The Japanese capital expenditure rate is higher than the U.S. and the
French rate lower throughout the 1980s. By the end of the period, both the U.S. and France
have R&D intensities for these samples of rms that are within one percentage point of the
investment to sales ratio, while Japan's is still somewhat lower (just over 3 percent for R&D as
compared with 7 percent for capital expenditures).10 The levels and trends in cash ﬂow dier
considerably across countries: roughly constant in the United States and Japan and increasing
in France, with the rate much higher overall in the United States. This cash ﬂow measure is
10As mentioned earlier, this dierence probably reﬂects the level of vertical integration in the Japanese rms.
14approximately equal to revenues less labor and material costs in all three countries: that is, it
is should be a measure of cash available for both kinds of investment, as well as for payments
to shareholders, possibly bondholders, and the government. The nal panel of Figure 3 shows
the cash ﬂow to sales ratio net of these two investment streams: by the end of the 1980s, the
cash ﬂow available for shareholder payments is approximately zero for Japan, while it is still
quite positive and of roughly the same order of magnitude for France and the United States.
[Figure 3 about here]
As a nal summary of the data relationships in our three samples, we present the simple
correlations of the growth rates of our ve key variables in Table 4. With the exception of the
correlation of R&D growth and cash ﬂow growth (which may be related to the way the data
was constructed), in all cases the correlations are highest for the United States.
TABLE 4
Correlation of Deﬂated Growth Rates: 1978-1989
Sales R&D Investment Employment
R&D .324, .138, .208
Investment .314, .231, .258 .181, .146, .095
Employment .609, .551, .197 .271, .170, .118 .376, .262, .172
Cash Flow .561, .142, .531 .130, .100, .212 .165, .061, .166 .294, .059, .048
The order of the correlations in each cell of the above table is U.S., France, Japan. The number
of rms is 204, 156, and 221 respectively, except for the cash ﬂow correlations, where the numbers are
174, 104, and 200 (see Table 2 for details on the sample).
From this survey of the main features of our samples, we conclude that there are no real
surprises in the data: as expected, the United States generally exhibits higher correlations of
most variables with cash ﬂow, and United States employment ﬂuctuates more over the cycle.
In addition, the Japanese tangible investment rate is quite high, and there is a tendency to
invest at a much higher rate out of prots in Japan. However, we also found some evidence
15that the samples may not be completely comparable, in that the vertical integration in the
Japanese rms seems to be greater, leading to a sample that is less concentrated in the particular
sector on which we are focusing our attention. Of course, this fact is yet another reﬂection of
the dierences in corporate institutions across the three economies, and not an "error" in
constructing the samples.
4 Bivariate Causality Testing
As we discussed earlier, the central goal of this paper is to describe the dierences in the
"causal" relationship or dynamics between R&D and investment on the one hand and sales
and cash ﬂow on the other across three economies that have dierent institutional structures
for corporate governance and nance. In this section of the paper, we perform this exercise
using conventional Granger-causality testing. That is, we ask questions like the following:
"Conditional on past R&D behavior and on average R&D behavior over the sample, does cash
ﬂow help to determine future R&D in the rm?" To perform these tests, we use a methodology
similar to that of Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988).
In Hall and Mairesse (1998), we present a series of investigations into the univariate time
series processes that describe our data and reach the following conclusions: 1) Tests for the
absence of correlated rm eects are somewhat inconclusive, and 2) because the rst dierenced
series often display near random walk behavior, the small sample bias of instrumental variable
estimation persists even when the sample is fairly good-sized. For these two reasons, we specify
our two variable model for causality testing with a permanent rm eect, and we estimate our
model using GMM with a restricted set of lagged level variables as instruments. Our maintained
model is the following:






γsxit−s + "it (1)
i =1 ;::::;N rms t =1 ;::::;T years (T = 12)
16i is a correlated rm eect and t are year dummies. "it is a serially uncorrelated disturbance
(when m is large enough).
After dierencing, the appropriate orthogonality conditions for GMM use lagged x's and
y's as instruments. We use a maximum of 5 lags, based on our experience with nite sample
bias in GMM when the full set of orthogonality conditions is used. Our assumptions imply the
following set of orthogonality conditions:
E[ziruit]=0 t = m +2 ;:::;T; r =m a x ( 1 ;t− 6);:::;t − 2( 2 )




s=1 γsxit−s and zir =[ xir yir]. For example, there
are 25(T −m−1) orthogonality conditions in (??)w h e nm = 5 plus T −m−1 for the year
dummies for a total of 11  (12 − 6) = 66.11
Using (??) as our basic specication, we conduct the following tests: First, Arellano and
Bover (1994) suggested that lagged x's and y's can be used as instruments for equation
(??) in levels. Blundell and Bond (1995) show that this is valid if the initial deviation "i1 is
not correlated with the initial level of y, which is proportional to the rm eect i.W e t e s t
for the validity of this restriction (notated AB in the tables) by adding equation (??)t oo u r
estimation and usually accept the restriction:
E[zit−1uit]=0 t = m +2 ;:::;T (2(T − m − 1) additional restrictions) (3)
Second, conditional on the results of our test of Arellano and Bover's restriction, we choose
t h el e n g t ho ft h el a gf r o mm =2 ;3;4;or5. At the chosen length, we check that the A-B
restriction still holds. Once we have a preferred specication, we test for causality with a joint
test of the signicance of the γ's . If we accept zero γ's, then x does not cause y. If we reject,
x causes y or a third variable causes y (orboth). The results of this procedure for the sales,
11Computing the number of OCs is somewhat more complicated when M<5. For example, suppose T =1 2a n d
m = 3. Then the periods used for estimation are 5 through12, and the instruments for ui5 are (xi1;x i2;y i1;y i2);
those for ui6 are (xi1;x i2;x i3;y i1;y i2;y i3); those for ui8 are (xi1;x i2;x i3;x i4;x i5;y i1;y i2;y i3;y i4;y i5), and
those for ui12 are (xi5;x i6;x i7;x i8;x i9;y i5;y i6;y i7;y i8;y i9). Thisyieldsatotalof2(2+3+4+55) = 68 OCs
plus the 8 for the intercept (year dummies) for 74 in all.
17cash ﬂow, R&D, and investment variables are shown in Appendix A and summarized in Tables
5a n d6 .
The tables in Appendix A are organized in the following way: The top panels show the
length of lag m that was chosen, together with the results of the causality tests with and
without the AB restriction imposed. The bottom panels show the actual coecient estimates
at the chosen lag length; the estimated sums of the coecients are shown in Table 6. We also
show the results of the test for the validity of this restriction, which is accepted easily in most
cases. The exceptions are the relationship between cash ﬂow and both investment and R&D in
Japan, and more weakly, between investment and sales in France and Japan. This implies that
in general the random year-to-year disturbances in sales, cash ﬂow, and R&D are not correlated
with the initial levels of these variables. In some, but not all, cases, adding the orthogonality
conditions implied by AB reduces the standard errors substantially.
Table 5 summarizes the results of the causality testing, choosing the test that is based on
the estimates with AB imposed where that restriction is accepted at the one percent level, and
the other test if it is rejected. The causality tests themselves are not very meaningful in an
accept-reject sense, since they almost all reject noncausality; that is, the second (x)v a r i a b l e
helps to predict the rst (y) variable even in the presence of y's own lags. The only cases where
we can accept non-causality is in France, where sales does not cause investment and Japan,
where investment does not cause sales. However, the magnitude of the test statistic and the
sum of the lag coecients on the variables display a large amount of rather systematic variation
and are quite informative.
The bottom panels of the tables in Appendix A give the full set of estimated lag coecients
for each bivariate regression, again with and without AB imposed. We summarize these results
in Table 6, which shows the sum of the lag coecients for the chosen regressions, for each pair
of variables, and for each country, 24 regressions in all.
From the perspective of the question we posed at the beginning, the results in Table 6 are
18very striking: the U.S. data display a high predictive power of cash ﬂow for both R&D and
investment, particularly when contrasted with France and Japan. The coecients of cash ﬂow
in both the R&D and investment regressions are strongly positive in the United States, and
very small in the other countries, except for investment in Japan, whose coecient is half the
level of that in the United States. For whatever reason, liquidity or ﬂexibility in the face of
demand shocks, large U.S. scientic sector rms seem to be more sensitive to cash ﬂow changes.
The results for sales are quite similar, although the contrast between the countries is somewhat
weaker in the case of R&D.
At the same time, the role of investment in generating future cash ﬂow appears to be some-
what weaker, possibly zero in Japan and negative in France. The impact of R&D investment
on future cash ﬂow in Japan is also zero, but in the U.S. and France, it is much higher than
the impact of ordinary investment.
The sales regressions display the same kind of results, but much weaker: in this case sales
growth clearly predicts R&D growth in all three countries, although somewhat more strongly
in the United States. The converse is that R&D does not appear to cause future sales growth,
except in the United States, and even here the coecient is small (on the order of .09).12
Investment appears unrelated to future sales in all three countries.
12It is worth noting that the magnitude of this coecient is approximately equal to the estimate obtained
using production function estimation with sales growth as the dependent variable and the growth in capital,
labor, and R&D capital as the independent variables (see Mairesse and Hall 1995). Thus our estimates here are
consistent with the traditional TFP regression approach, but they highlight the fact that the simultaneity that
we observed in the relationship between the inputs and output of the production process may be much more
important running from output to input than from input to output.
19TABLE 5
Causality Testing
United States France Japan
Number of Firms 174 104 200
Does CF cause I? 111.3 (4) ** 12.6 (5) * 71.4 (4) **
Does CF cause R? 235.2 (4) ** 67.3 (3) ** 16.3 (3) **
Does I cause CF? 40.7 (3) ** 26.7 (5) ** 25.5 (4) **
Does R cause CF? 42.0 (3) ** 116.9 (4) ** 25.6 (3) **
Number of Firms 204 156 221
Does S cause I? 84.8 (3) ** 6.6 (4) 77.6 (4) **
Does S cause R? 200.7 (4) ** 133.0 (4) ** 57.2 (3) **
Does I cause S 35.0 (5) ** 14.0 (4) ** 8.0 (5)
Does R cause S? 39.5 (4) ** 13.7 (3) ** 38.0 (4) **
In each case, the statistic shown is a chi-squared (degrees of freedom) for the hypothesis that the
lagged \causal" variables do not enter the equation once the appropriate lags of the dependent variable
are included. That is, the statistic 111.3 (4) is the joint signicance of the rst 4 lags of the logarithm
of cash ﬂow in an equation with the logarithm of investment as the dependent variable and 4 lags of
the logarithms of cash ﬂow and investment as the independent variables.
20TABLE 6
Sums of the Estimated Lag Coecients: Bivariate Regressions
Investment and R&D with Cash Flow
Dep. Var. Lag Indep. Vars. United States France Japan
Investment Investment -.111 (.074) -.607 (.053) -.007 (.066)
Cash Flow .825 (.086) .081 (.099) .411 (.075)
R&D R&D .316 (.038) -.124 (.019) -.066 (.037)
Cash Flow .431 (.031) .124 (.020) .042 (.059)
Cash Flow Cash Flow .101 (.043) -.578 (.052) -.372 (.054)
Investment .075 (.038) -.170 (.080) .039 (.049)
Cash Flow Cash Flow -.235 (.046) -.303 (.050) -.413 (.047)
R&D .226 (.060) .345 (.053) .023 (.028)
Investment and R&D with Sales
Dep. Var. Lag Indep. Vars. United States France Japan
Investment Investment -.008 (.050) -.192 (.099) -.183 (.086)
Sales .608 (.073) -.181 (.197) .171 (.137)
R&D R&D -.055 (.053) .142 (.053) .167 (.022)
Sales .628 (.053) .536 (.071) .408 (.057)
Sales Sales .562 (.061) .006 (.068) .362 (.066)
Investment -.127 (.047) .013 (.025) .038 (.039)
Sales Sales .170 (.062) .086 (.052) .705 (.029)
R&D .092 (.045) -.056 (.028) -.004 (.016)
The table shows the sum of the estimated lag coecients together with their standard errors in
parentheses for the 8 bivariate regressions reported in Table 5, one set for each country.
215 Conclusions
We view these results as rather preliminary, but highly suggestive. The oft-told story of a softer
budget constraint on investment in the major continental countries and Japan when compared
to the United States is clearly supported by our analysis. However we would be extremely
cautious about drawing strong conclusions from these data yet, for two quite dierent sets of
reasons. First, ndings like those here do not automatically imply that liquidity constraints
are at the root of the dierences: what we may be seeing is a greater ﬂexibility of rms in
the United States in all dimensions when faced with demand shocks; consider the evidence of
the employment ﬂuctuations. In addition, we have not fully explored the question of whether
the \softer" budget constraint that may exist in the absence of active public nancial market
discipline means more or less productive investment, although the evidence of the reverse re-
gressions is slightly daunting in this regard; in many cases we see no positive impact on sales
and cash ﬂow from investments as long as four years after they are undertaken.
The other reason for caution is the limited nature of our analysis thus far. First, bivariate
regressions may not control properly for changes in other closely related factors; for example,
it is more natural to include capital and labor when regressing sales on R&D, and surely
investment and R&D are related in their impacts on cash ﬂow. Extensions to this paper will
conduct the causality testing in a multivariate setting. Second, we found in Appendix A that
many of our univariate time series displayed random walk behavior. This suggests that a fruitful
avenue of exploration might be to look for cointegration between our main variables in the spirit
of recent work by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1997), where they allow short run dynamics to
vary across units but impose a constant relationship in the long run.
In spite of these caveats, the results in this paper are highly suggestive, especially when
compared with those of Bond et al (1995) on investment and cash ﬂow in U.K., Belgian, French,
and German rms, which show much higher sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow in the U.K.
than in the other three countries. Our work conrms a similar stylized fact for both investment
22and R&D, contrasting the cash ﬂow sensitivity of U.S. rms with lack of the same in France and
Japan. Given the gross similarity of the governance structures in the U.S. and U.K. and their
dierences from continental economies and Japan, our view is that the similarity of our results
to those of Bond et al is not an accident: for whatever reason, either quicker responsiveness to
market demand signals or higher costs of external capital, the Anglo-American environment is
one in which there is a tighter correspondence between cash ﬂow, prots, and sales on the one
hand, and investment expenditures on the other.
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267 APPENDIX A: Bivariate Causality Regressions
TABLE A.1a
Does Cash Flow Cause Investment
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (174) 4 or 5 32.0 (5) ** 9.9 (13) 111.3 (4) **
France (104) 5 5.9 (5) 11.8 (11) 12.6 (5) *
Japan (200) 4 34.6 (4) ** 9.6 (13) 71.4 (4) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Investment)
Without AB With AB
Country Investment Cash Flow Lag Investment Cash Flow
US -.110 (.057) .333 (.107) 1 .183 (.033) .434 (.046)
-.287 (.031) .158 (.040) 2 -.211 (.021) .070 (.025)
-.121 (.038) .185 (.040) 3 .009 (.028) .153 (.033)
-.085 (.032) .220 (.048) 4 -.093 (.018) .168 (.025)
-.085 (.023) .090 (.037) 5 -- --
-.688 (.144) 1.006 (.198) Sum -.111 (.074) .825 (.086)
France -.162 (.051) .027 (.089) 1 .006 (.043) -.011 (.053)
-.309 (.037) .024 (.028) 2 -.373 (.031) -.009 (.033)
-.185 (.028) .049 (.024) 3 -.136 (.022) .046 (.019)
-.116 (.026) .050 (.020) 4 -.062 (.026) .032 (.025)
-.081 (.025) .032 (.020) 5 -.106 (.025) .022 (.018)
-.853 (.126) .182 (.149) Sum -.607 (.053) .081 (.099)
Japan -.077 (.051) .279 (.080) 1 .172 (.034) .346 (.057)
-.206 (.032) .034 (.041) 2 -.097 (0.24) -.025 (0.35)
-.095 (.023) -.017 (.037) 3 -.035 (0.20) -.060 (0.33)
-.088 (.020) .178 (.038) 4 -.046 (0.19) -.150 (0.32)
-.467 (.104) .474 (.124) Sum -.007 (0.66) -.411 (0.75)
27TABLE A.1b
Does Cash Flow Cause R&D?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (174) 4 1272.4 (4) ** 8.6 (13) 235.2 (4) **
France (104) 3 or 4 18.7 (4) ** 14.1 (15) 67.1 (3) **
Japan (200) 2 or 3 16.3 (3) ** 26.1 (15) * 21.6 (2) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is R&D)
Without AB With AB
Country R&D Cash Flow Lag R&D Cash Flow
US .216 (.049) .182 (.022) 1 .304 (.060) .240 (.020)
-.057 (.019) .083 (.012) 2 -.100 (.022) .059 (.017)
.042 (.013) .058 (.010) 3 -054 (0.16) .087 (.012)
.023 (.012) .094 (.010) 4 .111 (.049) .158 (.016)
.224 (.045) .416 (.040) Sum .316 (.038) .431 (.031)
France -.141 (.034) .089 (.016) 1 -.128 (.015) .081 (.012)
-.025 (.011) .022 (.011) 2 -.013 (.005) .025 (.007)
.008 (.011) -.004 (.008) 3 .016 (.005) .018 (.005)
.002 (.008) .009 (.005) 4
-.126 (.054) .125 (.037) Sum -.124 (.019) .124 (.020)
Japan .028 (.025) -.022 (.037) 1 .216 (.017) .055 (.025)
-.035 (.014) .058 (0.17) 2 -0.14 (.012) .069 (.015)
-.058 (0.12) .005 (.017) 3
4
-.066 (.037) .042 (.059) Sum .202 (.015) .124 (.020)
28TABLE A.2a
Does Investment Cause Cash Flow?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (174) 3 20.4 (3) ** 9.8 (15) 40.7 (3) **
France (104) 5 19.2 (5) ** 6.5 (11) 26.7 (5) **
Japan (200) 4 25.5 (4) ** 30.1 (13) ** 25.5 (4) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Cash Flow)
Without AB With AB
Country Cash Flow Investment Lag Cash Flow Investment
US .067 (.038) .008 (.028) 1 .203 (.030) .005 (.023)
-.091 (.017) -.001 (0.14) 2 -.104 (.015) .002 (.013)
-.019 (.015) .050 (.013) 3 .002 (.013) .068 (.011)
-.043 (.056) .057 (.046) Sum .101 (.043) .075 (.038)
France -.275 (.054) .010 (.024) 1 -.261 (.043) -018 (.036)
-.152 (.031) .019 (.008) 2 -.117 (.025) -.015 (.019)
-.106 (.020) -.012 (.005) 3 -.104 (.017) .054 (.020)
-.072 (.014) -.035 (.016) 4 -0.77 (.012) -.053 (0.14)
-.065 (.013) -0.26 (.011) 5 -.069 (.012) -.030 (0.09)
-.670 (.096) -.044 (.090) Sum -.578 (.052) -.170 (.080)
Japan -0.57 (-.035) -0.23 (0.25) 1 .050 (0.33) -0.31 (0.25
-.237 (.029) .011 (0.12) 2 -.230 (.017) -.003 (.013)
-.082 (.018) .013 (.012) 3 -.067 (.017) -.013 (.011)
.004 (.018) .040 (.009) 4 .052 (.017) 0.31 (.009)
-.372 (.054) .039 (.049) Sum -.195 (.052) -.015 (.049)
29TABLE A.2b
Does R&D Cause Cash Flow?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (174) 3 49.5 (2) ** 13.9 (13) 42.0 (3) **
France (104) 4 60.2 (4) ** 12.2 (13) 116.9 (4) **
Japan (200) 3 25.6 (3) ** 31.0 (15) ** 32.5 (3) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Cash Flow)
Without AB With AB
Country Cash Flow R&D Lag Cash Flow R&D
US -.154 (.029) .137 (.068) 1 -.124 (.028) .170 (.092)
-.086 (.019) .083 (.022) 2 -.075 (.017) .092 (.020)
-.033 (.013) -.008 (.019) 3 -.037 (.010) -.036 (.015)
4
-.273 (.058) .211 (.075) Sum -.235 (.046) .226 (.060)
France -.143 (.041) .361 (.068) 1 -.103 (.032) .416 (.049)
-.161 (.018) .047 (.023) 2 -.174 (.013) .028 (.016)
-.065 (.012) -.023 (.022) 3 -.053 (.010) -.020 (.014)
.002 (.010) -.091 (.017) 4 .029 (.009) -.079 (.012)
-.366 (.054) .294 (.077) Sum -.303 (.050) .345 (.053)
Japan -.093 (.030) -.023 (.020) 1 -.107 (.071) -.014 (.016)
-.201 (.017) .050 (.010) 2 -.210 (.034) .049 (.009)
-.119 (.016) -.003 (.009) 3 -.122 (.028) .010 (.009)
4
-.413 (.047) .023 (.028) Sum -.438 (.042) .044 (.023)
30TABLE A.3a
Does Sales Cause Investment?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (204) 3 37.8 (3) ** 12.8 (15) 84.8 (3) **
France (156) 4 7.2 (4) 7.7 (13) 6.6 (4)
Japan (221) 4 33.2 (4) ** 13.9 (13) 77.6 (4) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Investment)
Without AB With AB
Country Investment Sales Lag Investment Sales
US -.057 (.043) .619 (.137) 1 .159 (.030) .636 (.070)
-.239 (.022) .112 (.054) 2 -.141 (0.15) -.648 (.047)
-.072 (.018) .013 (.043) 3 -.025 (.017) .020 (.037)
-.368 (.071) 743 (.136) Sum -.008 (.050) .608 (.073)
France -.010 (.060) -.181 (.265) 1 .172 (.050) -.093 (.215)
-.230 (.032) .056 (.085) 2 -.197 (.027) -.065 (.077)
-.129 (.024) .135 (.065) 3 -.095 (.020) .094 (.059)
-.088 (.026) -.124 (.073) 4 -.072 (.024) -.117 (.066)
-.458 (.119) -.115 (.247) Sum -.192 (.099) -.181 (.197)
Japan -.184 (.059) .392 (.222) 1 .053 (.044) .430 (.149)
-.211 (.034) -.458 (.117) 2 -.111 (.026) -.698 (.089)
-.127 (.024) .089 (.087) 3 -.055 (.021) .196 (.079)
-.080 (.020) .308 (.083) 4 -0.70 (.020) .243 (.083)
-.603 (.033) .330 (.229) Sum -.183 (.086) .171 (.137)
31TABLE A.3b
Does Sales Cause R&D?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (204) 4 86.4 (4) ** 16.8 (13) 200.7 (4) **
France (156) 4 80.2 (4) ** 18.2 (13) 133.0 (4) **
Japan (221) 3 25.1 (3) ** 13.2 (15) 57.2 (3) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Investment)
Without AB With AB
Country R&D Sales Lag R&D Sales
US -.081 (.042) .233 (.067) 1 -.087 (.036) .287 (.047)
.001 (.011) .111 (.023) 2 -.005 (.011) .137 (.018)
-.007 (.015) .146 (.025) 3 -.003 (.012) .108 (.021)
.030 (.014) .064 (.024) 4 .040 (.011) .097 (.022)
-.056 (.049) .555 (.081) Sum -.055 (.053) .628 (.053)
France .081 (.047) .313 (.089) 1 .188 (.041) .352 (.075)
-.049 (.014) -.029 (.028) 2 -.060 (.012) -.063 (.026)
.011 (.012) .069 (.024) 3 .038 (.010) .063 (.020)
-.019 (.017) .178 (.020) 4 -.024 (.013) .184 (.022)
.024 (.059) .531 (.087) Sum .142 (.053) .536 (.071)
Japan .042 (.024) .224 (.106) 1 .179 (.017) .290 (.060)
-.047 (.013) .083 (.040) 2 -.019 (.012) .048 (.029)
-.036 (.013) .099 (.036) 3 .006 (.009) .070 (.026)
4
-.041 (.033) .406 (.105) Sum .167 (.022) .408 (.057)
32TABLE A.4a
Does Investment Cause Sales?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (204) 5 23.0 (5) ** 9.1 (11) 35.0 (5) **
France (156) 4 or 5 14.0 (4) ** 20.0 (11) * 18.57 (5) **
Japan (221) 5 8.0 (5) 21.0 (11) * 23.0 (5) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Investment)
Without AB With AB
Country Sales Investment Lag Sales Investment
US .236 (.049) -.016 (.019) 1 .213 (.042) -.026 (.019)
.072 (.024) -.028 (.011) 2 .124 (.023) -.032 (.011)
.040 (.022) -0.15 (.011) 3 .078 (.021) -.024 (.011)
.098 (.020) -.008 (.007) 4 .093 (.019) -.010 (.007)
.042 (.020) -.028 (.008) 5 .054 (.019) -.035 (.007)
.488 (.067) -.096 (.048) Sum .562 (.061) -.127 (.047)
France -.021 (.061) .002 (.012) 1 -.070 (.069) -.019 (.017)
-.053 (.019) .008 (.007) 2 .056 (.020) .004 (.009)
.020 (.015) .008 (.005) 3 .072 (.017) -.004 (.008)
.061 (.021) -.006 (.004) 4 .072 (.024) -.008 (.007)
-- -- 5 -0.35 (.024) -.013 (.005)
.006 (.068) .013 (.025) Sum -.016 (.077) -0.39 (.040)
Japan .074 (.069) .009 (.013) 1 .017 (.064) .011 (.012)
-.104 (.034) .001 (.009) 2 -.090 (.031) -.006 (.009)
.091 (.025) .015 (.008) 3 .166 (.024) .015 (.007)
.134 (.026) .005 (.008) 4 .126 (.026) .003 (.007)
.166 (.026) .008 (.006) 5 .178 (.024) .012 (.006)
.362 (.066) .038 (.039) Sum .398 (.060) .035 (.036
33TABLE A.4b
Does R&D Cause Sales?
Country m Causality w/o AB Test for AB Causality with AB
US (204) 4 27.2 (4) ** 7.7 (13) 39.5 (4) **
France (156) 3 3.8 (3) 22.7 (15) 13.7 (3) **
Japan (221) 4 10.2 (4) * 13.0 (13) 38.0 (4) **
Chi-squared tests with degrees of freedom in parentheses. ** denotes signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 5% level.
Estimated Coecients of the Lag Variables (Dep. Var. is Investment)
Without AB With AB
Country Sales R&D Lag Sales R&D
US .161 (.048) -.006 (.035) 1 .128 (.043) -.023 (.034)
-.064 (.018) .047 (.011) 2 -.042 (.018) .047 (.011)
.012 (.020) .022 (.011) 2 .040 (.019) .036 (.010)
.056 (.019) .026 (.009) 4 .044 (.018) .032 (.009)
.165 (.064) .089 (.046) Sum .170 (.062) .092 (.045)
France -.015 (.044) -.019 (.024) 1 -.063 (.043) -.060 (.024)
.043 (.009) .004 (.008) 2 .074 (.016) -.007 (.006)
.046 (.013) .010 (.005) 3 .075 (.011) .011 (.005)
4
.073 (.054) -.005 (.029) Sum .086 (.052) -.056 (.028)
Japan .473 (0.43) -.003 (.015) 1 .679 (.036) .009 (.012)
-.122 (.026) -.007 (.005) 2 -.163 (.026) -.015 (.004)
.040 (.023) .006 (.004) 3 .075 (.025) .018 (.005)
.138 (.022) -.013 (.007) 4 .113 (.018) -.016 (.004)
.533 (.040) -.016 (.020) Sum .705 (.029) -.004 (.016)
34FIGURE 1


























































































































































































































































Median Growth In Deflated Sales
BCHM 19-May-98FIGURE 2

















































































































































































































































































































Employment - Interquartile Range
BCHM 19-May-98FIGURE 3












































































































































































































































Median Net Cash Flow Ratio
BCHM 19-May-98